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Aesthetics explanation and the archaeology of symbols1 
	
Philosophers of science have worried about how Ôtheoretical entitiesÕ 
such as forces, fields and electrons could play a respectable role in the 
explanation of observable events and processes; some of them 
concluded that we have no reason to believe in such things. There are 
archaeologists who show signs of treating the aesthetic in the same 
way: as a suspicious postulate of theory, far removed from experience. 
While IÕm content to believe in some entities which, by any reasonable 
test, would count as theoretical I donÕt put the aesthetic in that 
category. Nor do I worry about its capacity to pay its keep by 
contributing to explanations. Here I argue for the reality, and the 
explanatory power of the aesthetic. I illustrate the latter claim by 
considering the role of aesthetic attributions in explaining the 
emergence of symbolism. 
 
1. Two concepts of the aesthetic 
Appeals to aesthetics in archaeology are often seen as recourse to 
something defined by a theory devised in the eighteenth century and 
tuned to the cultural history of modern Western Europe, with its self-
conscious roots in Greco-Roman culture and the Renaissance.2	The 
theory postulates acts of uncontaminated perception, demanding 
attention to the pure form of objects isolated from their contexts.3 ItÕs 
																																																								
1 Earlier versions of this paper were read at a conference on philosophy and 
archaeology organized by Elisabeth Schellekens at the Institute of 
Philosophy, London, November 2013, and at a conference in the same place 
on interpretation organized by Stephen Neale, June 2015. My thanks go to 
those who commented on those occasions or who read drafts. They include 
Noel Carroll, Peter Kivy, Peter Lamarque, Derek Matravers, Stephen Neale, 
Rania Papavisilou-Ballis, Colin Renfrew, Elisabeth Schellekens. I am 
particularly grateful to Maria Forsberg for discussions on the work of Bloom 
and colleagues (see text to note 29). 
2 Terms like Òthe aestheticÓ are Òhighly culture specificÓ (Colin Renfrew, 
ÔHypocrite voyant, mon semblable . . .Õ, Cambridge Archaeological Journal, 
(1994) 4: 265). For more on the claim that aesthetics is culture-bound see 
my ÔArt and the anthropologistsÕ, in A. Shimamura & S. Palmer (eds) 
Aesthetic Science, Oxford University Press, 2012. 
3ÒÉthe aesthetic: an isolable and universal human experienceÓ (Shanks & 
Tilly, Re-constructing the Past, 1992, p.73).  
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hardly controversial that approaching artefacts of the very distant 
past (or even those of classical Greece and Rome) from this 
perspective will result in distortion and misunderstanding. 
 
We might question the extent to which western aesthetic thinking in 
the modern era is committed to the narrow and austere picture 
archaeologists conjure up. Take paleoanthropologist Randall WhiteÕs 
characterization: Òcontemporary western concept of artÓ conjoins a 
number of Òculturally defined assumptionsÓ that lead up Òblind 
alleysÓ. Among them are these:  
 
Art is thought to be a uniquely human activity that fulfills an 
innate need in people to comprehend themselves and the 
universeÉ; Works of art are thought to require an audience, 
primarily made up of people with special knowledge of artÉ; Art 
may also be appreciated for its purely visual elements: form, 
composition, colour and the likeÉ; The effects of these on the 
viewer are thought to be virtually universal, based on natural 
visual sensitivities that allow even an untrained eye to 
appreciate themÉ.4 
 
ItÕs a stretch to include innateness as part of an official ÒwesternÓ view 
given the opposition in western cultural circles to innateness, and the 
idea that other species donÕt produce art is not confined to the modern 
west. The expectation of an audience is also common outside the west 
and within western culture has its own exceptions: we find detailing 
on church carving that is just about impossible to see. When it comes 
to the role of experts, White wants it both ways. Hoping to convict the 
western view of elitism, he tells us that audiences are expected to be 
made up of people with special knowledge; hoping to convict it of 
philistine imperialism, he says that we assume our natural visual 
sensitivities are enough to give us everything we want. White is 
unlikely to describe as elitist the view that one cannot appreciate the 
art of other societies unless you know something about those 
societies, their conventions, practices and techniques of making, and 
the idea that the untrained, uninformed eye is the eye you want when 
looking at pictures is the opposite of western orthodoxy, with its 
emphasis on connoisseurship and the cultivation of discriminatory 
looking. 
 
																																																								
4Prehistoric Art, Abrams, 2003. 
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When it comes to characterizing aesthetic theory archaeologists are 
apt to get it wrong. But there is something that divides us beyond 
getting the theory right. Instead of seeing aesthetic concepts as 
theoretical constructions imposed on the world I see the aesthetic as 
an aspect of the world itselfÑsomething we find in artefacts, and in 
the minds of their makers and users. There is, of course, aesthetic 
theorizing, but it is theorizing about something given as part of 
ordinary experience. Theorizing about language and kinship does not 
make these things into ÒtheoreticalÓ entities about which we ought to 
be suspicious and no one reacts to the failure of a theory of language 
by concluding that language does not exist. The same goes, on this 
account, for the aesthetic. Properly understood, an aesthetically 
informed archaeology is an attemptÑnot always successful and 
always subject to critical scrutinyÑto see, within the archaeological 
record of a community, the manifestation of aesthetic interests on the 
part of its members, and to use that evidence to account for aspects of 
their lives that need explaining. 
 
What sort of thing, then, is an aesthetic interest? As with so many 
philosophical questions, it is not easy to find a definition, and no 
reason to abandon our project if we donÕt find one. But very roughly 
and for present purposes I say it is a tendency to engage in and attend 
to acts of making which display care and skill in the organization of 
appearances beyond practical need, and to the results of such acts. 
We find this tendency in just about every period, place and 
community of the human world. 
 
This rough characterization does not correspond to what all or most 
archaeologists mean by ÒaestheticsÓ when they complain about the 
imperialist ambitions of aesthetics and aestheticians. Am I embarked 
on a merely verbal dispute, dissipated by the discovery that we are 
not, after all, talking about the same thing? No. We should not 
understand the issue to be whether the aesthetic, defined precisely as 
the archaeologists choose to understand it, has explanatory power. 
We should understand it thus: is there some reasonable way of 
characterizing aesthetic phenomena on which it turns out that the 
aesthetic does have explanatory power? I say there is, and that much 
of the opposition to the aesthetic in archaeology (and not every 
archaeologist is opposed to it) derives from a failure to consider that 
characterization. If thatÕs right it will be worth spending a moment 
elaborating the proposal. 
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2. Aesthetics	for	archaeology	
The first thing to be said is that, while aesthetic responses are 
responses to the appearances of things they are not, on this account, 
the result of attention merely to surfaces, as might be the case with 
our interest in pleasing patterns of frosting on a window. We admire 
the shape of the vase for the skillful act of shaping it discloses. What 
is delicate for an object made in one way wonÕt be delicate for 
something made in another, whatever the shape, for only the first way 
of making exhibits delicacy in the handling.5 IÕm not sure that anyone 
would seriously dispute this point if put directly, but when 
archaeologists speak slightingly of the aesthetic, as they sometimes 
do, it seems to drop out of the picture. The Greco-Romanist Bert 
Smith takes aesthetics to be concerned only with the question 
whether something is beautifulÑa question he says the Romans 
would not have asked: 
 
One might, like an ancient viewer, find a particular Roman 
portrait exceptionally fine, that is, finely made, of very high 
quality Ñ for example, the Ostia Trajan or the Bloomington 
Septimus SeverusÉ. In informal private conversation, 
subjective hyperbolic phrases ('fantastic piece') might even be 
used as convenient shorthand terms that sum up quickly those 
qualities of fine execution and expressive impact. But these are 
not, properly speaking, questions of aestheticsÓ6 
 
In what sense are fine execution and expressive impact not aesthetic 
categories? Both suggest a relation to the maker; the first in terms of 
action and the second in terms of emotion. If one excludes such 
relations from the domain of the aesthetic one will sympathise with 
the exclusion of these two concepts from the same domain. But such 
																																																								
5 This approach to the aesthetic is well expressed in Kendal WaltonÕs ÔStyle 
and the products and processes of artÕ (in Leonard B. Meyer & Berel Lang 
(eds.), The Concept of Style. University of Pennsylvania Press 45--66 (1979); 
much in GombrichÕs Art and Illusion (Phaidon Press; 6th edition) is 
illustrative of the idea. See also Jerry Levinson, ÔWhat a musical work isÕ, 
Journal of Philosophy 77:5-28 (1980) and my An Ontology of Art, London, 
Macmillan,1989.  
6 ÔA Greek and Roman Point of ViewÕ, Cambridge Archaeological Journal, 
(1994) 4: 260.  
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narrowness makes our attitude to art and to aesthetically crafted 
things inexplicable. The aesthetics of photography is not the 
aesthetics of painting, even when the painting and the photograph are 
visually indistinguishable, because of the very different ways of 
making that go with these two kinds of objects. Knowing that a 
musical performance has been speeded up in the recording studio or 
that the picture we thought was by Giotto was actually painted last 
week make a difference to our aesthetic reaction to these object. 
Current aesthetic theorising recognises that ÒbeautyÓ is too general a 
category to be of much critical or interpretive help. We need to hear 
that the workÕs appearance is balanced, intriguingly unbalanced, 
teetering between balance and unbalance, amusingly ugly, deceptively 
simple, captivatingly complex.7 
 
Aesthetics, understood this way, is at home far beyond the art world, 
finds application in everyday objects as easily as in galleries and 
museums, and lines up (as we will see) with concepts from biological 
and cultural evolution such as reliable signals and prestige goods.8 
Because of its emphasis on making it is distant from what we call Òthe 
aesthetics of natureÓ, unless one choses to found that study on the 
idea of a creator whose qualities are made manifest to us in 
landscape.9 
 
The second thing to be said is that just as aesthetic responses are not 
attempts to isolate things from their contexts of making, aesthetic 
explanations easily conjoin with, and sometimes require, other sorts 
of explanations. Why was the artefact made to look like this rather 
than like that? Part of any such explanation is likely to be functional: 
spear throwers are visibly distinct from fish hooks for functional 
reasons. But spear throwers do not all look alike and some are 
																																																								
7 The best account of the specificity and detail characteristic of aesthetic 
concepts is Frank Sibley, ÔAesthetic conceptsÕ, in Approach to Aesthetics, eds 
J. Benson, E. Redfern & J. Roxbee Cox, Oxford University Press, 2001. In 
earlier work (An Ontology of Art, Macmillan, 1989) I argued that art works 
actually are the actions performed by makers; see also David Davies, 2004, 
Art as Performance, Malden, MA: Blackwell. But the view outlined above is 
not dependent on the truth of this admittedly extreme formulation. 
8 See e.g. Plourde, A. M. (2008). ÔThe evolution of prestige goods as honest 
signals of skill and knowledgeÕ, Human Nature, 19, 374-388. 
9  An issue briefly but illuminatingly discussed by Malcolm Budd (The 
Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp.4-5). See 
also Anthony Savile, The Test of Time, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982), 
Chapter 8.  
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fashioned in ways that go beyond making them good for throwing 
spears and may occasionally make them worse. Indeed functional 
considerations often form the background against which aesthetic 
attributions are possible; change your assumptions about an objectÕs 
function and a new range of aesthetic attributions may come into 
focus. 10 
 
When we explain an objectÕs appearance in aesthetic and functional 
terms we conjoin the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic horizontally, in a 
joint explanatory enterprise. There are also vertical associations. We 
may seek to explain aesthetic sensibilities in non-aesthetic terms, and 
non-aesthetic phenomena in partly aesthetic terms. It would be a 
simplification to say that aesthetic responses derive from sensory 
biases driven by sexual selection. But even if it were no simplification, 
it would not make the aesthetic a redundant category; that which can 
be explained in other terms may still be real. And the fact, if it is one, 
that cave art fostered social relations may be explained in partly 
aesthetic terms; the promotion of shared aesthetic responses to things 
may be a partially mediating variable between the depiction and the 
social solidarity. 
 
All this would be of little use to the archaeologist who wants to pack 
some aesthetic concepts along with all their other equipment if we did 
not also think that the aesthetic artefacts of very distant communities 
could be intelligible to us. All the evidence suggests that they can be. 
We are often struck by artefacts from culturally distant communities, 
artefacts we initially know little of beyond their appearance, though 
that appearance attracts our attention and our admiration. As we 
learn more about these artefacts and their communities, their modes 
of making, their beliefs and institutions, we start to understand them 
and to appreciate them better, correcting errors in our earliest and 
spontaneous judgements; it is rare for those earliest responses to be 
																																																								
10 Views hospitable to this perspective include those of Howard Morphy: ÒThe 
separating out of aesthetics from meaning and function is precisely the 
product of applying a particularly narrow contemporary art world concept of 
aesthetics to archaeological analysis rather than seeking to define aesthetics 
in relation to the culture in question.Ó (ÔAesthetics across Time and Place: An 
Anthropological PerspectiveÕ, Cambridge Archaeological Journal, (1994) 4: 
259).  
7		
Currie:	Aesthetics and the archaeology of symbols		
for	BJA	
04/10/2016!
wholly overthrown by the learning process. 11  The aesthetic is a 
universal of human experience in one way unlike that other universal, 
language. Present a monolingual English person with a bit of text or 
speech in Chinese and they will understand nothing at all. Languages, 
except where historically closely related to our own, are opaque to us. 
The aesthetic is not transparentÑwe donÕt see immediately and 
without instruction all there is to see in an alien aesthetic object. But 
it is translucent rather than opaque: from the beginning we are 
generally able to see something of value in the artefacts of cultures 
very distant from our own. 
 
As long as aesthetics is understood in the formalist and culturally 
circumscribed terms I have urged us to abandon, it will struggle for a 
place in debates about the development of language or symbolic 
culture, and inquiries into the aesthetics of Middle and Upper 
Paleolithic artefacts will be lampooned as attempts to treat deep caves 
as hard-to-access art galleries. If, on the other hand, we see human 
aesthetic concerns as sensitivities to the visible manifestation of skills 
and qualities in our conspecifics, aesthetic concepts take on a 
potentially explanatory role in the enterprise of finding and 
interpreting the evidence of social and cognitive evolution and their 
interactions. Aesthetic attention and sensitivity are forms of social 
cognition, presenting objects as expressive of characteristics of the 
maker. Aesthetic perception carries informationÑoften vital 
informationÑabout what people are like. I will illustrate this claim by 
offering an admittedly abstract characterization of how a community 
might arrive at symbols of social status, starting with behaviours, 
which are culturally and cognitively much less sophisticated. 
 
3. Meaning and manifestation 
Adopting the vocabulary of current archaeological theory, it is 
tempting to frame this approach to aesthetics as telling us about the 
meaning of an aesthetic artifact. But an undifferentiated category of 
the meaningful is something I wish to get away from. Ian Hodder has 
said that a garlic crusher means social class,12 that refuse means dirt 
or impurity, that archaeological evidence and its layout is Òtext.Ó13 He 
																																																								
11 See again my ÔArt and the anthropologistsÕ. 
12 Ian Hodder, ÔThe interpretation of Documents and Material CultureÕ, in 
Denzin, Norman K. & Lincoln, Yvonna S. (eds), (1994). Handbook of 
Qualitative Research, (pp. 393-402). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 
13 Ian Hodder, Reading the Past, Cambridge University Press, 1986, 1. 
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gives us a taxonomy of meaning-kinds, based on a distinction between 
Òthe effect [an object] has on the worldÓ, its place in a code, and Òthe 
historical content of the changing ideas and associations of the object 
itselfÓ.14 Thus conceived, meaning is co-extensive with any kind of 
significance anything might have for anyone. 15  I join the post-
processualists in seeing the personal, the subjective and the 
qualitative as legitimate areas for archaeological inquiry.16 But not 
every act of mind is an act of meaning, not every interaction between 
persons is a trading of meanings, and the things agents intentionally 
make or alter are not always things with meaning. Archaeology is 
deeply concerned with mind, with interpreting artefacts in terms of 
the states of mind that created or altered them and with using those 
artefacts to understand the minds of their makers; it need not resort 
to the principle that the features that we cite in these interpretive 
projects are always meaning-conferring features. 
 
What might we add to our explanatory tools to avoid using meaning 
for every conceivable job? I start with the idea of behaviour that 
manifests a mental state or trait. The defeated sports fanÕs drooping 
posture on emerging from the stadium manifests her disappointment. 
Does it mean anything? It is an instance of what Grice called natural 
meaning, underpinned here by a reliable correlation between two 
things, as when we say that smoke means fire.17 But that does not 
make it a case of conventional or intended meaning; the behavior 
manifests the state without the agent herself manifesting it, as would 
happen if the fan deliberately adopted, displayed, exaggerated, 
sustained or failed to repress the posture.18 In those latter cases we 
																																																								
14 Ian Hodder, ÔThe contextual analysis of symbolic meaningsÕ, in Hodder (ed) 
The Archaeology of Contextual Meanings, Cambridge University Press, 1987, 
p.1. (p.81). 
15 Having just side stepped one verbal dispute letÕs avoid another; ÒmeaningÓ 
has no settled meaning to which I am insisting we conform, and if someone 
insists on using it to cover all the kinds of significance an object or event 
may have the most sensible response is to ask them to make some careful 
distinctions within that class. I am going to use ÒmeaningÓ more narrowly 
but what matters are the distinctions, not the labels for them. 
16 ÒÉit is ideas, beliefs and meanings which interpose themselves between 
people and thingsÓ (Ian Hodder, Reading the Past, 3). 
17 See H. P. Grice, Meaning, Philosophical Review, 66 (1957): 377-88.  
18 The possibility of suppressing a response yet refraining from doing so is 
emphasised by Mitchell Green (Self Expression, Oxford University Press, 
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can speak of the agent manifesting the state, and if she does so in a 
way that intentionally makes clear that she is doing these things we 
can say that she means something by the behaviour: the agent then 
has, in relevance theoretic terms, both an informative and a 
communicative intention.19 But behavior can manifest a state or trait 
without any person manifesting it. 
 
I take it that manifesting state or trait S is a narrower notion than, say, 
carrying information about S. Your posture may, for me at least, 
manifest your depressed state but not manifest some little-known 
psychopathology which nonetheless is nomically correlated with that 
posture. IÕm inclined to say that I ÒseeÓ the sadness in the personÕs 
posture, but not to say this about the psychopathology, though, 
having learned about the connection, I might be able to conclude that 
the person does suffer from the disorder. The same contextual 
dependence holds when we consider acts of manifestation; what states 
or traits you manage to manifest depends on the receptiveness of your 
audience. 
 
I donÕt put much weight on the idea of perception here. I am unsure 
that we literally see such things as sadness or compositional skill, and 
if this is perception it is perception of a very malleable kind; we have 
seen that what counts as manifested is to a considerable degree 
audience relative. 20  Perhaps the best test we have of whether 
something is manifested in behavior is the aptness of the metaphor of 
seeing, not the truth-value of the claim that we literally see the state 
or trait. 
 
Granted the notion, we can distinguish three cases: 
																																																																																																																																																														
2007) who claims that the possibility of suppression makes a behavior 
voluntary.    
19  See Dan Sperber & Deidre Wilson, Relevance: Communication and 
Cognition, Second edition, Blackwell 1995.  
20 This has implications for how we understand aesthetic expertise. Knowing 
more about a cultureÕs artefacts is not just a matter of gaining propositional 
knowledge about materials, styles and techniques; it is partly a matter of 
retuning and refinement that enables one to respond with feeling as one 
comes to (as we say) see the skills and capacities that oneÕs propositional 
knowledge reveals. And this retuning applies not only to the objects of 
another culture; art-historical training helps to refine oneÕs capacity to see 
the qualities expressed in already familiar artefacts.  
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a) where the behaviour merely manifests the state or trait S (there 
being no intention on the agentÕs part to inform anyone about the 
state); 
b) where the behavior broadcasts S (there being an intention to 
inform); 
c) where the behavior communicates S (there being, additionally, an 
intention to get the audience to recognize the intention to inform). 
 
In all three cases the behaviour manifests S, but only in the first case 
is S merely manifested. 
 
We find states and traits manifested in the result of behaviour as well 
as in the behavior that creates them. It is at least as appropriate to 
say that I see the compositional skills, the care, attention and 
sensibility in the painting that results from the artistic behavior as it 
is to say that I see it in the behavior itself, should I be lucky enough to 
witness the act of composition. Achuelean handaxes, about which I 
will say more, are notable for their capacity to manifest the 
skillfulness of their makers, their shapes and the marks on their 
surfaces carrying a visible record of their construction. And makers 
were able, it seems, to impose further constraints on their own acts of 
making through choice of materials and iterations of making, thereby 
manifesting other or more refined skills, or manifesting those same 
skills more vividly. A spectacular set of five handaxes dated at about 
600kya was found at Oldovai Gorge in Northern Tanzania. They are 
impractically large, notably symmetric, and made from hard-to-work 
quartzite; outline drawings of their shapes, superposed, are highly 
coincident. This and their positions at discovery make it likely that 
they were the work of a single individual.21 Objects as distinctive as 
these are often found in this later period of handaxe production, about 
one million years into the long history of that industry. 
 
There has been much talk of handaxes as instruments of sexual 
selection, signaling manual dexterity and strength, the capacities to 
plan a complex task and to locate the appropriate materials: all things 
of potential relevance for mate-choice. Further suggestions in this 
																																																								
21 See Mary Leaky, Oldovai Gorge, volume 5, Cambridge University Press, 
1994, pp118-9. See also my ÔHandaxes, art, and the minds of early humansÕ, 
in E. Schellekens and P. Goldie (eds) The Aesthetic Mind: Philosophy and 
Psychology, Oxford University Press, 2011. 
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region include the display of emotional regulation, commitment to a 
task and possession of a socially secure position.22 These claims have 
met with some skepticism.23 But the view that handaxes functioned 
on occasion as signals takes other forms as well. A recent suggestion 
is that axe production was a complex process requiring organization 
and planning that amounted to an instance of what evolutionary 
theorists now call Òniche constructionÓ, a process whereby the inter-
generational landscape of adaptation for a species is altered by the 
speciesÕ own modification of its environment. The thus modified 
environment favoured those with hard-to-gain stone knapping skills 
and attendant abilities in resource location, quality assessment and 
caching, thus promoting an apprentice system for learning. In such 
an environment displays of knapping and related skills served as 
signals from teachers of their relevant capacities; skilled teachers 
would then benefit through displays of reciprocity from the learners 
they enrolled.24 
																																																								
22 The idea that handaxes were reliable signals was first developed in Kohn, 
M. and Mithen, S. 1999. ÔHandaxes: products of sexual selection?Õ Antiquity 
73: 518Ð526. Penny Spikens develops the argument further in ÔGoodwill 
hunting? Debates over the ÔmeaningÕ of Lower Palaeolithic handaxe form 
revisitedÕ, World Archaeology, 44 (2012): 378-392.  
23 For criticism see Nowell, A. and Chang, M. 2008, ÔThe Case against Sexual 
Selection as an explanation for Handaxe MorphologyÕ, PaleoAnthropology 
2009: 77−88. See also the somewhat rhetorical exchange of letters with 
Mithen in PaleoAnthropology 10 (2012). While there are evidential 
weaknesses in MithenÕs argument Nowell and ChangÕs emphasis on the lack 
of evidence for a sexual selection explanation for human preferences for 
symmetry seems beside the point when they admit that such a preference 
exists, which is all that MithenÕs argument needs. The claim need only be 
that, for whatever reason, potential mates were attracted by symmetrical 
artefacts and that this attraction was adaptive because it signaled the 
possession of capacities such as strength and dexterity. It is irrelevant 
whether bodily symmetry signals good genes or good health. 
24 ÒTransmission of lithic skills depended on apprentices distinguishing more 
skilled knappers, and since various rewards presumably attached to that 
excellence a context emerged in which there was benefit to be gained by 
master knappers who developed more ornate and technically difficult artifact 
production strategiesÓ (Peter Hiscock, Learning in Lithic Landscapes: A 
Reconsideration of the Hominid ÔÔToolmakingÕÕ Niche, Biological Theory, 
(2014) 9:27Ð41, p.40).   
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For present purposes IÕll simply assume that the career of the 
Acheulean handaxe is in part a story of signaling traits of their 
makers. I invite those skeptical even of this claim to indulge me for a 
moment; it will provide a concrete illustration of an abstract scheme of 
development. It is then a substantive question for archaeology where, 
if at all, this pattern is exemplified. The interest of the pattern is that 
it shows how it is possible to get from a system of signaling no more 
cognitively demanding or complex than we find operating between 
peacocks and peahens to a fully symbolic artefact. 
 
If hand axes served partly as signals of socially relevant qualities, they 
did not automatically do so by manifesting those qualities, that is, by 
making them manifest to an audience. In other words, signals are 
prior to episodes of manifestation, even to episodes of mere 
manifestation. PeacockÕs tails may signal a healthy immune system 
but they need not be thought of as making the bearerÕs health 
manifest to the peahens, who presumably never think about health or 
immune systems. All that needs to happen for effective signaling is 
that peahens be attracted to peacocks in proportion to the 
luxuriousness of their tails. Let us call this bare signaling. But in the 
one and a half million years that handaxes were in production our 
ancestorsÕ cognition changed remarkably; it is likely that at some 
stage community members would have seen handaxe making as 
indicative of personal qualities, while axe makers in the same position 
would then be able to make of their actions deliberate displays of 
those qualities. A timetable for this development is hard to fix given 
the uncertainties about the origins of language and other crucial 
milestones, but something can be said about an ordering of stages in 
which each stage presupposes the previous one. I present this in 
terms of abstractly characterized stages, not to be thought of as 
discrete historical episodes: 
 
1. Bare signaling: At the first stage hand axes and their making  
function as bare signals of desirable social traits; conspecifics 
respond to the signals by being more likely to defer to, learn 
from, form alliances with, or mate with those whose axe making 
																																																																																																																																																														
.  
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practices signal these traits; they need not be made aware, by 
the signal, of the qualities signaled. 
2. Behavior which manifests certain qualities: At the next stage 
subjects, makers and audiences are conscious that certain 
qualities are signaled by the behaviour, though signalers do not 
intend the signal to manifest those qualities. Receivers need not 
have a very clear idea about what exactly these qualities are; 
they may think of them, at some stage in the process, as 
Òqualities, whatever they are, which make this relationship 
promisingÓ. 
3. Intending to manifest: Makers, aware that their acts of making 
manifest qualities, use their acts of making as ways of 
manifesting their qualities, deliberately modulating their 
creative behavior so as to turn up the volume of the signal; we 
see the large, overworked axes in easily fractured materials 
sometimes displaying twisted symmetries and occasionally 
shaped to reveal variations in composition of the stone or 
embedded fossils. 
4. Communication: It is common knowledge between makers and 
observers that these acts of making sometimes function, and 
are sometimes intended to function, as efficient signals of 
personal quality. 
 
By stage 4 acts of making are sometimes recognized as intended to 
inform observers of the personal qualities of makers. In Relevance 
theoretic terms, observers sometimes recognize an informative 
intention on the makersÕ part, though at this stage the maker need 
not intend that this intention be recognized; they need not have a 
communicative intention.25 I donÕt have enough grip on what precisely 
symbols are supposed to be to say at what exact point in the process 
we start to find genuinely symbolic behavior but I think we can say 
this: Stage 1 is definitely pre-symbolic whereas Stage 4 definitely is 
symbolic26. 
																																																								
25  This is what Sperber and Wilson describe as unintended ostensive 
communication; see Sperber and Wilson, Relevance, pp.63-4. 
26 ÒStone tools were material symbols long before the ochre and jewelry of 
behavioral modernity,Ó (Kim Sterelny & Peter Hiscock, Signals, Symbols and 
the archaeological redord, Biol Theory (2014) 9:1Ð3. 
 
.  
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5. Special	symbols	
There is a part of this ideal history we have not yet characterised, one 
which helps us account for the important difference between ordinary, 
utilitarian symbols (modern examples would be words and road signs) 
and symbols invested with a special significance which certain hand 
axes may have acquired and which later artefacts, some of them 
morphologically related to hand axes, certainly did and do enjoy. 
 
Symbols can be special in many ways and I am not offering a 
comprehensive theory of specialness for symbols. I simply note that 
two distinct factors are relevant to the present case. One is already 
implicit in the development of stages 1-4 just outlined: objects which 
manifest the qualities of a person may be seen as valuable because 
they create a significant link between that person and you. The 
second idea, not always distinguished from the first, is that expressive 
objects can be thought of as repositories of the very qualities they 
express. Here the idea of contagion enters the picture: Òthe belief that 
a personÕs immaterial qualities or ÒessenceÓ can be transferred to an 
object through physical contactÓ27 
 
This characterization is due to the psychologist Paul Bloom and 
colleagues who, with acknowledgement to Fraser and others, argue 
that we can explain the value that people place on authenticity in art 
by appeal to contagion.28 In a number of experimental conditions they 
claim to find that contagion is a factor in determining peopleÕs 
valuation of artefacts associated with agents who have notably 
admirable or deplorable traits. Applying this idea to the evolution of 
special symbols, we may conjecture that some symbols become 
special by being seen as literally possessing the valuable traits of 
which they are expressive29. 
																																																																																																																																																														
 
27 Newman, G., Diesendruck, & Bloom, P., ÔCelebrity Contagion and the 
Value of ObjectsÕ, Journal of Consumer Research, 2011. The idea of contagion 
goes back to early anthropological work of Fraser, Mauss and Taylor and has 
been redeployed in current cognitive psychology by Paul Rosin.  
28 Newman, G. E., & Bloom, P. (2011) ÔArt and Authenticity: The Importance 
of Originals in Judgments of ValueÕ. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1037/a0026035. 
29 In her doctoral dissertation  (University of Stockholm, in progress) Maria 
Forsberg discusses BloomÕs work and other aspects of the contagion 
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Contagion, as Bloom and others understand it, is a suggestive notion 
but it is not quite what I need. For a start, talk of ÒessenceÓ here 
sounds odd, at least to a philosopher: the claim of contagion should 
not be that essential properties are transferrable. 30  The essential 
propertiesÑthe ones you have in every possible worldÑare the boring 
properties like being the person you are or perhaps (a bit more 
interesting) being the product of certain gametes. The properties we 
might see people as transferring are important but inessential 
properties like being a wonderful painter, being a mass murderer. 
Even Hitler isnÕt a mass murderer in every world. 
 
The second point is that contagion is said to depend heavily on the 
amount and intensity of physical contact between agent and artifact. 
ÒAn original Picasso may be valuable because Picasso actually 
touched itÓ they say.31  For my purposes what is important is not 
touching but making, which can be done without literally touching an 
object and coming no closer to it than the length of a paintbrush. 
Compare your attitudes to the following two paintings: one produced 
by Picasso but barely touched by him directly with virtually all contact 
mediated by the brush, and one painted by a minor artist, given to 
Picasso and worn by him as an eccentric form of insulation one Paris 
winter. From the point of view of physical contact the minor artistÕs 
picture ought to have more value, being the object with the more 
sustained and more intimate physical connection to Picasso, a bearer 
of many art-relevant qualities. But this is not at all a plausible 
prediction; what matters to anyone interested is what Picasso did to 
the painting, not how close he was to it and for how long. The one he 
wore but did not paint will be valued relatively low; it does not 
manifest PicassoÕs qualities as a painter, though it might manifest 
those of the minor artist.  The picture Picasso painted will surely be 
																																																																																																																																																														
hypothesis, including whether it is plausible to think that subjects believe in 
contagion or merely imagine it.  
30 See also Paul Rosin and Carol Nemeroff (ÔSympathetic magical thinking: 
the contagion and similarity ÒheuristicsÓÕ, in: Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & 
Kahneman, D. Heuristics and biases. The psychology of intuitive judgment. 
(Pp. 201-216). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002): ÒÉwhen 
objects make physical contact, essences may be permanently transferredÓ  
31 ÔArt and AuthenticityÕ, p.3. 
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valued high, with few questions asked about the duration or 
directness of his physical contact with it.32 
 
My final reservation concerns the idea of transference, and is hinted 
at in talk just now of Òquality-containmentÓ. Though Bloom and 
colleagues do not say more about what transference is, a natural way 
to understand transference of properties is as a process by which 
something which has a certain property confers that very property on 
another thing; in familiar cases of contagion a person who has a 
disease gives that disease to another. I have the property suffering 
from a cold, which I then cause you to have as well. But that is surely 
not what is thought to happen in cases we are now considering; a 
painter possesses an excellent skill, but no one thinks of the painting 
as having an excellent skill. 33 A more plausible characterization of the 
process is this: that we have a tendency to think of artefacts which 
manifest personal qualities (hand axes, sculptures, paintings, 
drawings) not as possessing those qualities but as containing them, as 
being in some way magical repositories of those qualities; a box can 
contain water without itself being water or watery34. In fact it is easy 
to see how a not clearly articulated sense that an object manifests 
certain personal properties (a claim which may be literally true) gives 
rise to the thought that somehow the qualities reside within the 
object. None of this, I grant, makes rational sense, but we are not in a 
region where ideas are expected to meet this condition. 
 
																																																								
32 The ÒmakingÓ theory on offer here does predict some correlation between 
valuing and assumed closeness of contact, on the grounds that the exercise 
of artistic skills and capacities generally requires such closeness. But it is 
the exercise of skill which, according to the theory, is the decisive factor, not 
the closeness.  
33 One tempting proposal here is to think of contagion not as something 
people literally believe in but as an idea capable of exerting the kind of 
pressure on cognition and action described by Gendler in introducing the 
idea of alief (see Tamar Szab Gendler, ÔAlief and BeliefÕ, Journal of 
Philosophy (2008),105:634-663). Aliefs are said to be states which may 
control action without being subject to constraints of rationality and of 
which the subject is often unaware. If aliefs constitute an explanatory 
category this will not help to make sense of contagion as literal transference 
of properties; ordinary subjects show no tendency in behavior to treat 
paintings as if they were skillful.   
34 This analogy is of limited usefulness since people need not think of objects 
as having spatial parts which contain qualities; since we are in the realm of 
magical thinking here it is not easyÑand probably not helpfulÑto give a 
fully articulated and coherent account of what is thought. 
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So my suggestion is that the specialness of some symbols is 
accounted for by this extra step from somethingÕs manifesting 
personal qualities to itÕs being a container of those propertiesÑ
without, though, possessing them in the way that a person possesses 
personhood or a box possesses boxness. I am not sure what label we 
should use for this supposed process but it is sufficiently different 
from the idea of contagion for us to avoid that term. 
We are now at the point where a handaxe may be thought valuable 
because it is a repository of valuable personal qualities. This 
immediately raises issues of possession; if an object contains valuable 
things, it is likely to be thought worthwhile to possess it, for then one 
possesses the valuable things. One could ask awkward questions here 
about the possessorÕs capacity to make use of the valuable thingsÑ
how does one extract the valuable qualities from the thing one 
possesses? But we donÕt have to find rational answers to such 
questions to understand the intuitive attraction of possessing quality-
containers. 
The desirability of possessing a quality-container now means that an 
object may become associated with someone other than the maker, 
and for different reasons. It is associated with the maker because it is 
an indicator of the makerÕs qualities; it is associated with the 
possessor because it is a signal of that personÕs possession of the 
qualities that enable them to possess it. And here again, aided 
perhaps by the use of ceremonies and other theatrical devices, the 
contagion effect can again be triggered; this time the artefact comes to 
be seen as containing those possession-enabling qualities, and the 
artifact shifts from being a symbol of the makerÕs qualities to being a 
symbol of those of the possessor. 
6. Explanation	vs	interpretation	
I have tried to show how aesthetic ideasÑunderstood in a certain 
wayÑcan mesh with others to form an explanatory chain that takes 
us from artefacts as mere signals to artefacts as symbols of social 
status. The idea is not that all such symbols go through this 
trajectory: once the idea is embedded in culture such symbols can be 
made to order. Rather, the story serves two purposes. First, and to 
repeat an earlier point: it indicates one way that a practice of using 
such symbols could emerge without being designed; it is then an 
empirical question whether and in what circumstances symbols 
actually have emerged in this way. Secondly, it illustrates a variety of 
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ways one creature can influence the behavior of another. Starting with 
a form of signaling common in nonhuman animals, we move then to 
the idea of behavior which merely manifests personal properties, 
thence to acts of manifestation and finally to instances of a relatively 
unsophisticated kind of communication. Notice how early in the 
process aesthetic sensibility turns out to be crucial; by making salient 
to observers the ways in which an objectÕs appearance manifests 
qualities in the act of making, it enables the transition from mere 
signals to acts of manifestation. 
I have called this an explanatory project. One of the fault lines in 
current archaeology concerns the merits of explanation as compared 
with something many want to contrast with explanation:  
interpretation. Processualist archaeologists from the 1960s on sought 
the status of an explanatory science for their subject, understood as 
marked by inference to observed phenomena from general statements 
of relations between variables of social and cultural change.35 There is 
a dispute about how much in archaeology has been achieved by using 
these methods, and the post-processualists, whose answer is Òvery 
littleÓ argue that the goal should be interpretation, not explanation.36 
However, it is far from clear what is served by this opposition, once we 
get away from the highly unrealistic insistence that explanation must 
involve derivation of the particular from the general. What we do need 
to keep in focus is the idea that explanation is an inquiry into the 
causes of things. Agreed, there may be domains that are explanation-
involving without appeal to causation: in mathematics and, perhaps, 
in what are called geometrical explanation. But the events studied by 
archaeologists have causes if anything does, and there does not seem 
to be anything very sinister in wanting to know what those causes are. 
Does taking an interest in those causes set us against the idea of 
interpretation? No. There may be interpretive endeavors that are non-
causal, as when we ask whether interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment this way would lead to the normatively best outcome 
																																																								
35Binford is credited with articulating this explanatory goal, first in his 
ÔArchaeology as anthropologyÕ, American Antiquity, 28 (1962): 217-225, and 
in later publications, sometimes citing Hempel on explanation. While Hempel 
treated explanatory principles as Humean regularities Binford seems to have 
wanted archaeological explanations to cite intelligible mechanisms of 
causation; on some of the tensions in the processualist theory of explanation 
see Alison Wylie, The conceptual core of the new archaeology, in her 
Thinking from Things: Essays in the philosophy of archaeology. University of 
California Press, 2002.  
36Post-processualists are sometimes called interpretive archaeologists.  
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rather than to something in line with FramerÕs intentions.37 But a 
good deal that one would point to as paradigmatically interpretive is 
causal without needing the support of general relations between 
variables. Interpreting your utterance of ÒIÕve had breakfastÓ as 
meaning that you had breakfast today involves seeing the utterance 
as having, as part of its causal history, your intention to communicate 
to me that you had breakfast today. Interpreting your slow walk and 
drooping shoulders as manifesting your sadness involves seeing your 
sadness as part of the causal history of your posture. Interpreting an 
artifact as manifesting the beliefs and values of an agent or group of 
agents involves seeing those beliefs and motivations as part of its 
causal history. These interpretive projects look very much like causal-
explanatory ones as well. Why, then, are explanation and 
interpretation pitted against one another? 
 
For some Post-Processualists the distinction between explanation and 
interpretation is one of attitude: interpretation is a less dogmatic 
activity than explanation. Shanks and Hodder say ÒThe interpretive 
practice that is archaeology is an ongoing process: there is no final 
and definitive account of the past as it wasÓ.38 But the rejection of 
dogmatism is available to all parties in this dispute. I may 
dogmatically insist that my explanation is right, or that my 
interpretation is right, or I might be undogmatically open minded on 
both questions. One may think that there is not one uniquely correct 
interpretation of something. If we think of causal explanation as 
inquiry into the causal history of an event or object, we find just as 
																																																								
37 In practice it is unlikely that any interpretation of the Constitution will be 
entirely free from causal assumptions; at most the Warren Court, deciding in 
Brown vs Board of Education could have asked was Òwhat could a 
contemporary reasonably be thought to mean by the Fourteenth 
Amendment?Ó To ask this question one needs the idea of intentional action, 
which is causal through and through. 
38  Michael Shanks and Ian Hodder, ÔProcessual, post-processual and 
interpretive archaeologiesÕ, in Interpreting Archaeology: Finding Meaning in 
the Past edited by Alexandra Alexandri, Victor Buchli, John Carman, Ian 
Hodder, Jonathan Last, Gavin Lucas, Michael Shanks, Routledge, 1995. The 
highly tendentious ÒGlossaryÓ to this volume offers this on Òexplanation and 
understandingÓ: ÒThe essential openness of interpretation, which aims at 
understanding, may be contrasted with the aim of closureÉ between 
explanans and explanandum, which is usually considered the aim of 
explanationÓ (237). For deflation of the ambitions of interpretive archaeology 
see Ernest Gellner, ÔInterpretive ArchaeologyÕ, in the same volume.  
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much reason to be skeptical of that task being completed.39 An eventÕs 
causal history is vast, and we only ever pick out bits from it, guided 
by relevance to the task in hand. What to focus on and at what level of 
description are pragmatic affairs. We certainly should not say that all 
explanations are equally good; some are worse than others and some 
are hopeless. But no explanation we are likely to come up with will 
ever be best, irrespective of context. The same goes for interpretation; 
the post-processualists wonÕt say, I hope, that all interpretations are 
equally acceptable and that this is what distinguishes the appeal to 
interpretation from the appeal to explanation. Interpreting handaxes 
circa 1mya as items in a system of monetary exchange is (much) less 
acceptable than interpreting them as tools for butchery, because the 
former is much less likely, given total evidence, than the latter which 
may in turn be less acceptable than some other interpretation yet to 
be thought of. 
 
It would be an absurdly arrogant version of explanationism to insist 
that wholly satisfactory explanations of archaeological phenomenon 
are easily found or that particular explanatory projects are easily and 
quickly completed, with no danger of revision. We cannot be certain 
that our explanations, however good they seem, are correct; we must 
always stand ready to revise them in the light of incoming evidence or 
new explanatory options which may be rivals, threatening to 
supersede our previous best endeavours. There is always more to say 
about a causal history. Epistemic humility is a sensible, even a 
required attitude, whatever our approach to the relation between 
explanation and interpretation. 
 
Explanation and interpretation may not be the same thing, and may 
not even be co-extensive. But the choice between them, when it is 
sensible to make it, should not be made by claiming that one and not 
the other is implicated in causality, or that one and not the other can 
be undertaken only in a dogmatic spirit. 
 
Greg Currie 
University of York 
 
																																																								
39 On explanation as the telling of causal history see David Lewis, ÔCausal 
explanationÕ, in his Philosophical Papers, vol II, Oxford University Press, 
1986. 
